The world of security and
strategic thinking is not for the fickle minded; neither is it for the “go
along” person. In this world, knee jerk reactions are often not the right ones.
While emotions should give way to careful analysis, so should logic and
strength of conviction be carefully weighed and ingratiated in the decision
making process.
When the administration of
President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (GEJ) took to the waves last week, in one
last gasp effort to curtail the Boko Haram menace, not less than the majority
who seem to have had it with the terrorist sect (and rightly so) took to
voicing overwhelming approval. It seem like Nigerians were just asking for any
action (emphasis on any mine). After months of bombings, maiming, killings and
attacks- we wanted the President to lead! And he finally, did.
Not surprisingly, the rare voices
of caution either from the regular opposition (Action Congress) or the marginalized
but vocal northern elders (ACF) or from foreign governments (United States
or Human Rights Watch) have been roundly dismissed by ordinary Nigerians as
nothing but nagging nabobs of negativism when the policy of matching force for
force with Boko Haram is concerned. While like the majority of Nigerians I wish
nothing but success for the ongoing operations, I’m concerned that we’re
ignoring the risk of failure.
First, the history of application
of force to quell uprisings in Nigeria has been checkered and more recently has
been an abysmal failure. Short the full scale quelling that military strongmen
applied in Maitatsine and Ogoni
that only allowed these crisis to boil over years later, the force applied by
former President Obasanjo in Odi against Niger Delta militancy and State of
Emergency in Plateau by the same have proven many years later to be utter
failures. In the former, only a negotiated amnesty led to some temporary peace
brokered by his successor while in the later, peace to date have escaped the
people.
Secondly, the Goodluck Jonathan
is notoriously inept. What will you call an administration that bungled the
renaming of a University after a popularly acclaimed icon of democracy? One
which can’t seem to get the simple task of getting a petroleum reform bill,
already speeding to conclusion under a sick predecessor, to become law in three
years? I can bet our dithering leader that occupies Aso Rock have not even
given the thought of how to pacify the North-East region after the assault. His
yes-men are busy buzzing around with braggadocio that they’ve forgotten that it
will be easier to win the war than the peace. What are Goodluck Jonathan’s
pacification plans for Borno, Adamawa and Gombe?
And just before you have enough
reasons to start doubting the inevitability of this “new tactic” working, we
should reexamine the reality of combating terrorism in other climes, and the
nature of the enemy. The ink had not yet dried up on Jonathan’s declaration
when bombs went off in Kano, and Katsina received the Boko Haram visitation – blowing up the Daura emirate’s
police station after sustained battle that killed several security agents
including soldiers and policemen. Right on cue, a church leader in
Maiduguri was killed by Boko Haram thirty minutes after the President went
on TV talking tough!
Fact is Boko Haram is more likely
to disperse to surrounding states- melt away for a moment and return more
virulently- than just disappear. The process of creating a terrorist is a
gradual and long road, that sudden match of force is unlikely to convince the
adherent to reverse course. The first rule of combating terrorism like any open
wound is to stop the bleeding. In Nigeria, we’ve ignored this lesson. The North
of Nigeria educates less people, breeds more poor and despondent Nigerians and
has the lowest development indices comparative to their Southern Nigeria peers.
This condition cannot be allowed to persist and without quick emergency action,
we’re losing the plot and may live to regret it.
Nigerians and Nigeria
unfortunately is also a fertile ground for any potential insurgent. With a
mixture of ethnicities and religions, and a thoroughly corrupt elite class
feasting large on the scarce resources of the land and increasing the gap
between them and they very large pool of the poor.
This social structure is
encouraged by an exploitative faith system of religions falling on themselves
to replace a non-existent government, and a strong believe in miracles
including “sudden riches” syndrome that keeps the poor subdued: but clearly not
for too long. It is this Nigeria that Jonathan administration is trying to
apply a quick fix of matching fire for fire; a problem that requires a thorough
cleansing will not tolerate a quick fix. Will the entire country or half the
country become the theatre of open warfare if Boko Haram disperses and refuse
to surrender as most analysts expect?
While we ponder that point, imagine for one second the
impact of internal militarization on the polity. What foundations are we laying
by putting soldiers on civilian streets, instructing some perhaps to apply
their tactics of violence on civilian population that are sometimes their kits
and kins? Well, think back what happened in 1966 and remember how the
foundation of those first coups like many across Africa was laid by the
injection of military power to internal conflicts that soon took on a life of
its own. Well, analysts call this the law of unintended consequences; I hope
the President’s men are thinking.
Of course, as the government
realize in about a year or two that the state of emergency that allows
unbridled show of force won’t work forever, I expect their inept self to keep
hitting harder and loose international support. If anything, this will amount
to winning the battle and losing the war. We will rue the day we went to war
with Boko Haram the day these insurgents and rag tag mercenaries of death start
dictating the terms of peace like the Malian
Tuareg rebels are doing under the auspices of the French today. Our
government should step around this carefully, as it could be the fatal blow
that grants these terrorists the legitimacy they do not deserve.
All said it might be the external
factors rather than the internal that will ultimately lend itself to the
failure of GEJ’s mission. Boko Haram under persecution may attract an influx of
support of the strong international network of funders of terrorism, now losing
ground in their familiar theater and seeking new homelands in the deserts of
Africa where governments have long abandoned their responsibilities.
Indeed, the answer to terrorism
may just be what Goodluck Jonathan and Nigeria’s group of elites and their yes
men find most difficult to comprehend or adhere to- good governance. For why
will a people turn to death as an end to itself if they have a reason to live
under a government that guarantees their general welfare and eschews
corruption?
