Nigeria is at a crossroads — and not the kind where hope marches in at dawn. Rather, this is the kind of turn that demands a national confession. When elite officers such as Colonel Dahiru Bako, Brigadier-General Dzarma Zirkusu, and now Brigadier-General M. Uba die in near-identical ambushes, it is no longer “bad luck.” These are systemic alarms — loud, bleeding, and painfully persistent.
On November 14–15, 2025, a military convoy in Borno State’s Damboa-Biu corridor was ambushed near Wajiroko, according to ISWAP. Two soldiers and two Civilian Joint Task Force members died in the firefight. ISWAP later claimed it captured Brig-Gen Uba and executed him; a chilling video and images circulated online showing him wounded. The Army initially denied the abduction, stating that Uba repulsed the attack with “superior firepower” and returned to base. But the militants doubled down, declaring him dead and publicizing the event through their propaganda channels.
This is not the first time a general has fallen. In 2021, Brig-Gen Zirkusu was killed by ISWAP in Askira Uba. These are not isolated coincidences — they point to grave vulnerabilities in intelligence, communications, and command protocols. If ISWAP can locate, isolate, and kill senior officers, something fundamental is broken at the core of Nigeria’s defense strategy.
Intelligence experts warn that the militants may no longer rely solely on covert hit-and-run tactics. Instead, they appear to use a hybrid model: human informants from local communities, real-time tracking, and tactical coordination. That combination means they can predict and exploit military movements. Add to that Nigeria’s notoriously slow reinforcements and poor extraction protocols, and you have a recipe for repeated disaster.
The Army’s acknowledgment of the Wajiroko ambush came only after ISWAP went public, suggesting a reactive — not proactive — posture. Worse still, the Army confirmed losing 17 motorcycles during the attack, a sign that the insurgents knew exactly which transport assets to target. The deaths of two soldiers and two CJTF members also raise major questions about how well military and civilian counter-insurgent forces are integrated.
This is not just about the loss of brave men — though that alone would be tragic enough. What is at stake is the credibility, cohesion, and competence of the Nigerian military. If Generals are becoming targets, what chance do rank-and-file soldiers have? If insurgents can track leadership, how secure are our bases and outposts? How much of our offensive strategy is compromised by leaks or compromised intelligence?
Furthermore, as ISWAP continues to claim victories and broadcast propaganda, the psychological battlefield is shifting in its favor. The ability to kill a Brigadier-General and sugarcoat it with narrative control is not just an operational win — it is a strategic blow to conscience and morale.
Nigeria must do more than mourn. It needs radical reform: overhaul intelligence systems, secure communications, toughen escort and extraction protocols, and root out moles — if they exist. The nation’s military doctrine must evolve as fast as the militants’. Otherwise, the next name on the casualty list could be even higher up — and by then, the cost may be beyond repair.
We cannot afford to treat this as “just another ambush.” What is happening in the North-East is not random violence; it’s a sustained dismantling of our security foundations. The question is no longer “if” another general will die — but “how many more” will have to fall before Nigeria finally wakes up.